The energy crisis highlights the need to avoid new dependencies for critical raw materials. Stepping up the EU’s ‘minerals diplomacy’ can offer a way forward – if coupled with financial firepower. Every oil crisis exposes how vulnerable Europe is to fossil fuel imports. Switching to renewables and electric vehicles will change that, but how do we avoid a similar dependency on the critical minerals needed? First of all, unlike oil these minerals are highly recoverable, so once imported they can remain in the system. Secondly, the metals are numerous and can be found in many places around the world, so securing a sustainable and diverse supply is key. That’s why critical minerals diplomacy with like-minded partners has been on the agenda for years. The results have been mixed. The European Commission has taken a number of global initiatives. These include the Critical Raw Materials Act, Global Gateway funding and numerous agreements with third countries, recently upgraded into Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships, or CTIPs. But the concentration of critical minerals supplies has only worsened. China controls processing for 19 out of 20 critical minerals, and export controls on raw materials continue to proliferate. And while 15 EU strategic partnerships with the likes of Chile and Zambia have been signed, these have not yet brought new supply to the market. The problem is not the lack of regulatory frameworks or political support. The need to work with like-minded partners is repeated by senior politicians at every occasion. And no Omnibus ‘deregulation package’ for minerals will solve the problem. The issue is the disconnect between good intentions in political declarations and having the actual tools to make progress on the ground. So, how do we go from handshakes to shovels in the ground? A major reset of Europe’s global minerals policy is needed. First, the EU needs to make its partnerships and CTIPs deliver concrete projects on the ground. As we explained earlier, this means choosing partners strategically and bringing domestic companies to the table that can provide the investment, know-how and offtake that resource-rich countries are looking for. The CTIP with South Africa is particularly interesting. The country has abundant resources of manganese, a mineral that is central to western-led battery chemistries’ (NMC) ability to compete with China-led lithium-iron ones (LFP). Replacing some of the nickel in those batteries with manganese would cut costs without undermining the performance. Given that China today refines almost all battery grade manganese, helping South Africa set up facilities should be a no brainer. This means bringing funding support and companies – for example, Umicore – to help the country ramp up the technology and provide offtake. Second, the EU needs the right tools to deliver on its minerals partnerships and diplomacy. This means having the ability to invest in projects directly. Australia, Canada, Japan and the US are all doing this already. Canada has moved quickly to secure the supply of scandium directly from Rio Tinto, while the US has taken a direct stake in rare earths processor MP Materials. Taking equity directly or providing some sort of price support would increase the investability of those projects. The EU has so far relied on the disjointed actions of national export credit agencies (ECAs) who have the cash but no strategy. The newly announced Critical Raw Materials (CRM) Centre should change this. The centre should go a lot further than mere coordination and stockpiling. Just like Japan’s JOGMEC, it should have sufficient budget – from both the resilience pillar of the new MFF and the Global Gateway – to support domestic and global projects financially. Ultimately, it should have an independent mandate and bring together miners, refiners, investors and offtakers. Finally, this does not mean going back on sustainability or social standards. Supporting projects directly also means shaping how their water treatment, tailings disposal or community engagement are done. When it comes to standards, where the EU should better leverage its soft power is in the G7 Minerals Alliance. Rather than selecting endless lists of projects, the one effective thing this forum should do is finally agree on the market access standard talked about for years. In other words, whose supply is in and whose is out. Such a framework, based on a targeted set of few environmental and social criteria to begin with, can then be taken up by like-minded partners in their various initiatives. This includes the new FORGE pushed by President Trump. The EU needs to equip its minerals diplomacy with financial firepower and bring business to the table to move from handshakes to shovels in the ground. By, Julia Poliscanova, Senior Director, Vehicles & Emobility Supply Chains, T&E